Causes of competitive analysis failure:  Understanding and responding to problems at the individual level. by Fleisher, Craig S. & Wright, Sheila
Causes of Competitive Analysis Failure: 
Understanding and Responding to Problems at the Individual Level 
 
 
Dr Craig S. Fleisher 
Windsor Research Leadership Chair and Professor of Management 
Odette School of Business 
University of Windsor 
Canada 
E-mail: fleisher@uwindsor.ca 
 
 
Sheila Wright 
Reader in Competitive Intelligence & Marketing Strategy 
Leicester Business School 
De Montfort University 
United Kingdom 
E-mail:  sheila.wright@dmu.ac.uk 
 
 
           Abstract 
It ought to be a fairly safe assumption that a CI analyst would want to perform the analysis task 
and execute their responsibilities successfully over time.  Such competencies should come with 
added experience on the job, as should the ability to reduce the risk of failure by diagnosing 
potential pitfalls.  This paper presents a) a unique four-level hierarchical model of analysis failure, 
b) ten key continua of competitive analysis skills which we believe an analyst has to master before 
they can consider themselves to be truly competent in their work, c) a discussion on the paucity of 
high quality teaching of these skills, and d) presents eight guiding principles which a firm should 
consider in an attempt to improve individual performance and reduce the potential for analysis 
failure.  Our purpose in identifying the possibility and causes of analytical failure is that we 
believe much can be learned by managers and practitioners from studying failures.  This learning 
can ultimately contribute towards creating a more successful analysis function which can only be 
beneficial to all concerned. 
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1  Introduction 
It hardly needs to be said that organizations and 
managers can learn from failures (Brown 2007) but 
it requires individuals to thoughtfully talk about 
and examine them, something which is rarely done  
except in cases of catastrophic, publicly visible 
failures (Edmonson & Cannon, 2005). Although 
analysis of failure is an accepted part of 
contemporary manufacturing industry practice, its 
application to an enterprise’s intelligence, planning 
and decision-making functions is less common 
(Heuer 2005, Underwood 2006).  In identifying the 
possibility and causes of analytical failure, we 
believe that much can be learned by managers and 
practitioners.  The first task is to be aware of the 
location of failure. 
2  Failure Location 
We would regard the highest level of failure to be 
that of business failure, whereby a business is no 
longer able to continue as a viable commercial 
entity.  If failure is defined as “discontinuance of 
business,” then it is likely that approximately two-
thirds of all start-ups will fail within their first ten 
years (Watson & Everett, 1996) and at even higher 
rates in some particularly difficult sectors such as 
retailing and restaurants.  Most of these business 
failures are commonly attributed to a general lack 
of effective planning and management skills 
exhibited by these firms’ executives. 
Beneath the level of the firm, we encounter 
planning, decision-making and implementation 
failures and these are partly composed of 
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intelligence failures. These can be further 
disaggregated into failures along the traditional 
intelligence cycle functions of planning, data 
collection, analysis, dissemination and  
communication (Chao & Ishii, 2003).  
Intelligence failures are distinguishable from 
more task-oriented intelligence errors, which are 
viewed as factual inaccuracies in analysis resulting 
from poor or missing data. Intelligence failure is 
defined by Johnston (2005, p6) as “systemic 
organizational surprise resulting from incorrect, 
missing, discarded, or inadequate hypotheses.” 
These failures may be due, in part, to failed 
analysis, but they can also be caused by other 
factors that interact with the analysis process.  
Attempting to disentangle or disaggregate the 
analysis portion of the process from other related 
processes is never an easy or straight-forward task. 
At a minimum, it is important that analysts and 
their decision-makers routinely carry out a post-
mortem on projects to try and determine any areas 
for improvement. 
Having suggested the need for post-task 
assessment of the analysis process, we recognize 
that there are a variety of problems associated with 
the evaluation of intelligence analysis and 
reporting that make this task more challenging. The 
range of cognitive biases impacting this process is 
outlined in greater depth by Heuer (1999).  Briefly 
summarized, he notes that: 
• Analysts normally overestimate the accuracy of 
their past judgments. 
• Intelligence clients or consumers normally 
underestimate how much they learned from 
analysis products such as reports or briefs. 
• Overseers of intelligence production who 
conduct post-mortem analyses of an 
intelligence failure normally judge that events 
were more readily foreseeable than was in fact 
the case 
When analysis is ineffective, both the analyst 
and the decision-maker often don’t know in time 
and frequently cannot identify the root cause(s) of 
the errors, problems or failure. They must consider 
the following questions underlying the potential 
errors. 
h Analysis problem definition 
Was the analysis problem, the Key Intelligence 
Topic (KIT)/Key Intelligence Question (KIQ), 
properly specified at the outset? Did the analysis 
process allow for any subsequent redefinitions of 
the problem? 
h Analysis project planning 
Did the analyst develop a project management plan 
or statement of work to perform the analysis 
process? Did they actually implement the process 
according to their plan or veer away from it mid-
course? 
h Data gathering error 
Was the appropriate data available to the analyst? 
If not, could the data have been efficiently 
acquired? Did the analyst properly account for data 
or information gaps? Was the analysis the cause of 
the failure or was data collection the primary 
cause? 
h Tool and technique-related error 
Did the analyst use the best available tools, 
techniques and/or analysis methods? Were the right 
tools used, and in the right sequence? 
h Synthesis error 
Did the analyst arrive at the optimal conclusion or 
insight? Did they “connect the dots” in a defensible 
manner? Would other experienced and successful 
analysts have connected them differently? 
h Communication transmission or 
channel error 
Did the analyst communicate their insights to their 
decision-maker throughout the project in an 
optimal fashion? Was the analysis failure really a 
communication failure? 
h Communication reception error 
Did the decision-maker have a complete and 
accurate understanding of the analyst’s conclusions 
before the decision needed to be made? 
h Unsystematic development error 
Did events arise during the course of the process 
that derailed the analysis or analyst? What impact 
did unexplained variance or random factors have 
on the outcome of the analysis task? 
Having located the source, or sources, of error, 
only then is corrective action effective. 
3  Four-Level Hierarchical Model of 
Analysis Failures 
Whatever the reasons experienced for analysis 
failures, it is valuable to identify why these happen 
and this is represented in a four-level model for 
identifying the barriers to generating effective 
competitive analysis.  These four levels, and the 
primary factors associated with each, are illustrated 
in Table 1. 
Whilst each of these sections warrants a full 
discussion on its own, for the purposes of this 
paper, we will concentrate on the aspect which we 
believe can be most effectively influenced by the 
individual analyst.  Some of these factors may be 
present in other categories and we recognise that 
there may be secondary or tertiary impact at other 
levels. 
 
Level Nature of Problem 
 
Individual 
Analyst Level 
Failures 
• Different natural analytical 
abilities 
• Naturally limited mental 
capacities 
• Natural motivation 
• Cognitive biases and 
perceptual distortion 
• Insufficient understanding 
and application of analysis 
tools and techniques 
 
Analysis Task 
Level 
Failures 
• Part of larger task 
• Task discontinuity 
• Unsatisfactory data inputs 
• Disconnects from decision 
making 
• Imbalance among key task 
facets  
 
 
Internal 
Organizational 
Level Failures 
• Some decision makers don’t 
understand and appreciate 
analysis 
• Clients cannot specify their 
critical intelligence needs or 
questions 
• Under-resourcing the 
analysis function 
• Lack of analysis-specific IT 
support 
• Lack of thinking time 
• Organizational culture and 
politics 
• Time and trust 
• Invisibility and mystery 
• Misconception that everyone 
can do  analysis 
 
External 
Environment 
Level Failures 
• Growing range of 
competitive factors 
• Complexity and turbulence 
• Data overload 
• Globalization 
• Educational deficiencies 
 
 
4  Causes of Failure at Individual 
Analyst Level 
The competitive analysis task is fundamentally 
performed by individuals, although they will also 
cooperate and collaborate with others to get their 
tasks accomplished.  From consulting and 
educational assignments, we have observed the 
following hindrance factors as being primarily 
present at the level of the individual analyst. 
4.1 Different natural analytical abilities 
People rely on a limited set of mental models, have 
preconceptions on issues, and exhibit a wide range 
of cognitive bias when reviewing information. 
People also think differently.  Some, in a right-
brained linear fashion, others in a left-brained 
lateral fashion.  This is important when viewed in 
light of analysis being a mixture of both scientific 
and non-scientific techniques. 
4.2  Naturally limited mental capacities 
The content and context facing most analysts has 
become more complicated, complex, and fast 
moving in recent years. Having said that, our 
brain’s natural abilities to effectively process 
additional information hasn’t evolved to match 
this.  The popular view that we only use 10% of 
our brain’s ability is a well-worn myth, and one 
could argue with the figure, but we are confident 
that human beings still only use a limited 
percentage of their brain capacity, although 
scientific record still does not have a sense of what 
that percentage might be (Kalat, 1998).  
In his influential article, Miller (1956) 
suggested that the magical number describing our 
natural information processing capabilities is seven 
things at one time plus or minus two. This could be 
a major problem for analysts who often have a far 
higher number of issues to keep in their mental 
calculus at any one time.  Although we now have 
better information technology systems to assist in 
the analysis task, we still have to use our brains in 
exactly the same way as we have always done. 
4.3 Natural motivation 
Given a choice between a more difficult or a less 
difficult task with identical outcomes, the majority 
of people would opt for the easier task. As we hope 
is already patently obvious by now, analysis is not 
an easy task and can require the use, or expenditure 
of, significant levels of cognitive, intellectual, 
organizational, and social resources to achieve 
optimum performance.  One reason it is so difficult 
is because we have far fewer published heuristics 
or “rules of thumb” to use in performing analysis 
than we do in many other fields of organizational 
endeavour such as engineering, scientific research, 
accounting, process management, sales and  
marketing.  Some analysts think that volume is the 
answer, not value.  This form of sufficing 
behaviour is unlikely to meet the needs of today’s 
demanding decision-making clients. 
Table 1 
Four-Level Hierarchical Model 
of Analysis Failures 
4.4  Cognitive biases and perceptual 
distortion 
In spite of the presence of the broad range of 
analytical techniques, some organizations still 
adopt poor strategies and their decision-making 
processes are vulnerable to individual cognitive 
biases or “groupthink.” Researchers have identified 
a variety of common cognitive biases that can enter 
into an individual's or groups' process of analysis 
(Bazerman, 2002; Kahneman et al, 1982; Sawyer, 
1999; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). These are 
identified in Table 2. 
 
Elements Nature of Problem 
Estimation Bias Over or under estimation 
of the magnitude of the 
effect of future events 
Escalating 
Commitment 
Continual commitment of 
time, effort and finance to 
support a failing project, 
even when there is 
evidence that it is a 
fruitless task 
Group-think Lack of pertinent 
questioning of underlying 
assumptions and an 
unwillingness to challenge 
entrenched leadership, 
engrained cultures and 
senior executives 
Illusion of Control An individual’s mis-placed 
confidence in their ability 
to control and immunity to 
error.  Illusion and group-
think are common bed-
fellows 
Prior Hypothesis 
Bias 
Individuals prone to this 
bias use data only when it 
confirms their beliefs, even 
when presented with 
contradictory analytical 
evidence   
Reasoning by 
Analogy 
Individuals use simple 
analogies to make sense of 
challenging problems. 
Oversimplifying complex 
problems can lead to 
detrimental judgment 
Representativeness The error of extrapolating 
data from small samples to 
explain larger phenomena.  
Inexperienced analysts find 
it hard to distinguish 
between apparent and real 
facts 
 
 
 
The existence of cognitive biases and groupthink 
raises issues of how to bring critical intelligence to 
bear on organizational decision-making 
mechanisms so that the decisions made are 
realistic.  It is important to understand the range of 
motives behind it.  Feldman and March (1981) 
pointed out that people in organizations often tend 
to collect more information than strictly necessary 
for decision making, partly to influence others and 
partly to be viewed as thorough in their work   In 
other words, analysis is often used not just for 
objective decision-making but also for political or 
symbolic purposes. 
4.5  Insufficient understanding and 
application of analysis tools and 
techniques 
Studies on the use of analysis tools and 
techniques have consistently demonstrated that the 
individuals responsible will use only a very limited 
set of tools and techniques, usually those they 
know the best and have previously applied with 
some perceived success (Gib and Gooding, 1998; 
Rigby, 2001, Rigby 2003, 2009).  This has also 
been identified as “tool rut” (Fleisher & 
Bensoussan, 2007).  Even when an analyst is 
willing to use an enlarged tool box and attempt 
tools and techniques outside their ordinary fare, 
they often lack the knowledge, understanding and 
experience to do it well.  It is no surprise therefore, 
that they will stick to the safe but well worn path of 
familiarity (Self, 2003, Marteniuk (2003, 
Morecroft, 2006, Swanson, 2007). 
There is also a misconception that everyone can 
do analysis.  Ask a business graduate whether they 
developed good analytical skills in their 
programme and you will almost always get an 
affirmative answer, yet few recognize the 
differences between the process of analysis and the 
ability to think.  Analysis requires a unique and 
differentiated form of pragmatic thinking.  Most 
individuals have neither been formally trained, nor 
have the natural ability, to perform this type of 
activity.  Although there has been a natural and 
healthy evolution of offerings available to those 
wishing to receive formal analysis instruction 
(Fleisher & Bensoussan 2003; 2007), few 
educational developments in this area have been 
positive, due in part, to the lack of experienced 
faculty staff and ambiguity of scope. 
5  Developing Intelligence Insight 
There is a long-standing debate about whether 
analysis is actually a craft, a discipline, a field, or a 
profession (Johnston, 2005, Marrin & Clemente, 
2005, Fleisher, 2003, Davis, 2002).  Much of this 
debate centres on how a competitive analyst has to 
balance the need to be creative with the need to 
Table 2 
Cognitive Bias Elements 
employ documented methods in their effort to 
produce good output (Pawelski, 2006, Fleisher & 
Bensoussan, 2007).  Although these two “art” and 
“science” elements are not necessarily 
diametrically opposed, they are generally perceived 
as two ends of a single continuum (Johnston, 
2005). 
The potential for the teaching of critical and 
intuitive analysis has been debated in the arena of 
business ethics (Griseri, 2002, Locke, 2006, Burton 
et al, 2006), multiculturalism (El-Hani & Mortimer 
2007, Kim, 2006), technology/science (Davies, 
2003) and popular culture (Snævarr, 2007).  A 
recent conceptual paper by Clark et al, (2006) 
identified scope within the marketing curriculum 
and Herrmann (2005) spoke of the need for 
scholars and practitioners to conceive “new 
dominant paradigms in strategic management that 
revolve around the concepts of knowledge, 
learning and innovation”.  Miller & Ireland (2005) 
agreed that “intuition has not been subjected to 
sufficient review”. 
In the higher and executive education system 
there is little evidence that teaching the skill of 
pragmatism and realism is taken seriously, albeit 
such a skill set is lauded as a distinct competitive 
advantage for an individual in their career 
(Fleisher, 2004, Dacko 2006).  In their review of 
marketing curricula, Evans et al (2002) concluded 
that "many marketing graduates are not being well 
equipped for the 'new marketing'.  Dacko (2006) 
and Lynch (2007) also observed that unless 
graduates are able to master the broader range of 
"soft" skills (of which we would claim critical 
analysis is one), then their ability to apply their 
subject knowledge will be severely limited.  Lynch 
(2007) also reported on research with employers 
which revealed that their requirements from 
graduates went well beyond the application of 
subject knowledge, and into the realms of intuition, 
creativity and common sense. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
In Figure 1 we outline ten continua which 
identify those skills which we believe a 
competitive analyst has to master before they can 
consider themselves to be truly competent in their 
work.  These continua have been developed not 
only from our research and experience of teaching 
competitive analysis, but also from discussions 
with a variety of practitioners of differing 
experience around the globe.  A few elements of 
the ten continua will inevitably overlap, but the 
intention has been to establish those with lower 
degrees of redundancy and repetition.  In order to 
carry out their work effectively, competitive 
analysts must be willing, able and competent at 
moving across the continuum to suit the situation to 
hand.   
5.1 Creative         Scientific 
Competitive analysts need to be skilled in the 
application of both creative and scientific 
techniques.  Good analysts will seek to combine 
differing intellectual patterns, which are reflected 
in the wider, often unique processes in any firm's 
decision making process (Clark, 2004).  
Experienced analysts develop the ability over time 
to know how to achieve the appropriate balance 
between the various elements, and approaches to 
the analytical task (Davis, 2002).  Although recent 
efforts have sought to document and replicate the 
approaches, methods and skills need to properly 
perform this analysis (Davis, 2002), most 
experienced analysts recognize that creativity that 
comes out of first-time connections or techniques 
can also be a source of valuable insight. If all 
competitive analysis is done scientifically, then the 
development of artificial intelligence, 
computational algorithms, and solutions-generating 
software would already have become the norm, a 
situation that at least a few experts suggest would 
be debilitating for analysis and decision making in 
most organizations (Gilad, 1994, 2004; Fuld 2003). 
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 Individual Enterprise3 Group 
 Intuition Intellect4
 Precision Perspective5 
 Past Future6 Present 
 Qualitative Quantitative7
 Automation Human Process8 
 Written/Spoken Visualisation9
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Figure 1 
The 10 Key Continua of Competitive Analysis 
5.2 Deduction       Abduction         Induction 
This continuum examines the sequence of analysis 
arising between assumptions, facts, and 
conclusions. It is important because many analysts 
begin their tasks with a plethora of data and facts to 
assist them, while others lack them. It is also 
important in cases where analogies or benchmarks 
are readily available and those cases in which these 
items are lacking. 
Deduction is the process of reasoning used by 
analysts whereby their conclusions follow from the 
stated premises (Clark, 2004).  In other words, 
analysts deduct inferences by reasoning from the 
general to the specific.  Deductive reasoning works 
best in so-called closed systems, which rarely exist 
in the competitive business arena. Nevertheless, as 
a critical mode of inquiry, it can be very useful in 
refuting specific hypotheses and helping the 
analyst arrive at more definitive estimates of the 
likelihood of prospective outcomes. Induction 
typically happens when an analyst is able to 
postulate causality amongst related phenomena.  It 
can also involve drawing out or analyzing 
assumptions or premises used in forming 
conclusions (Clark, 2004). 
Abduction is the process of generating an 
original hypothesis to explain evidence that does 
not easily or readily offer a common explanation. 
Compared to inductive reasoning, abduction 
expands the number and set of hypotheses 
available for scrutiny to the analyst (Schum, 1987). 
Some experts have referred to this as the “a-ha” 
type of reasoning whereby the analyst generates 
responses in a spontaneous fashion and probably 
cannot consciously articulate the steps they used to 
arrive at their outcome (Schmidlin, 1993). 
5.3 Individual         Group         Enterprise 
Analysts work on tasks across three generic levels 
of their organizations, individual, group and 
enterprise.  As in many problem solving and 
decision making endeavours, achieving success at 
all three levels involves more than just the additive 
burden of having to integrate more people into 
one’s task. Much of the analyst’s work is done at 
the individual level whereby they alone are 
responsible for the outputs.  Analysts will 
commonly work in collaboration with others, with 
the final product being the result of a joint effort.  
In these cases, the individual effort is difficult to 
identify as it becomes entwined and develops as a 
result of the group process. 
At the enterprise level, an analyst’s own group 
collaborators, and other groups within the 
enterprise will generate insights that are utilized by 
decision makers. This is the most complex process 
in an organization and as a consequence, it is more 
difficult for the individual effort to be identified.  A 
large part of the analyst’s role is to consider and 
integrate the firm’s context into their analytical 
process.  There is a paramount need for them to be 
cognisant of, and factor in, the social, political, 
historical, and cultural lenses through which their 
colleagues view the world (Fleisher & Bensoussan, 
2007). At the same time, it is important that they do 
not over-play the role of such corporate norms, 
otherwise they will become paralyzed and 
ineffective (Langley, 1995). 
5.4 Intuition         Intellect 
Similar but not the same as the creative-scientific 
continuum, this one suggests that analysts must 
employ their intuition, sometimes referred to as 
‘immediate cognition’ or the “Eureka effect” 
(Cutting & Kouzmin, 2004).  Intuition is inevitably 
influenced by past experience coupled with a 
natural proclivity to come to a judgment, often 
recognised as instinctive ways of knowing (Davis, 
2002).  Analysts will have a hunch or sense of 
something which they cannot readily express in 
writing. What makes intuition so important in an 
analytical context is that not only will the analyst 
use this to some degree in processing data, but the 
decision-maker will almost always use a similar 
skill in assessing the recommendations of the 
analyst.  Intuition is a prevailing power within the 
process. 
The use of intellect is where the competitive 
analyst is operating in a well thought out, 
calculated and rational manner. Intellect is driven 
by a data gathering plan and a strategy which is 
subject to time, social and other performance 
pressures which can impair it. 
Intellect and intuition may converge eventually, 
in an analyst’s recommendation, but the intellectual 
portion of their recommendation can be more 
easily communicated to recipients in the form of 
rules, concepts and/or techniques.  Intuition is less 
tangible, less easy to prove and rationally, less easy 
to account for. 
5.5 Precision         Perspective 
It is suggested that the majority of analysts will 
work in the broader context of the firm, rather than 
the more narrow and specific facets of precision. 
This is often analogized as the trade-off between 
seeing the “forest for the trees”.  A decision-maker 
will not usually need to know the fact that a 
competitor earned precisely 34.5632 % of their 
total revenues from a product called “Shiny Hair 
To Go”, rather, the perspective view that they 
generated approximately one third of their 
revenues from one product line.  In other words, 
answering the question, “thank you for the figures, 
but what does that actually mean?” 
Whilst the perspective view can tend to be more 
valuable, this does not mean to say that there is any 
room for a lack of precision in coming to that view.  
It is all a matter of what is reported and how it is 
done.  Competitive analysts should always seek to 
attain a reasonable level of precision without 
spending any more time than is necessary to 
produce a recommendation with an agreed level of 
confidence.  This will change by project, by 
situation and by decision urgency. 
5.6 Past         Present         Future 
Analysts make trades-off between the direction of 
time in which both their data, and their 
recommendations, are pointing.  Accounting data, 
competitor sales figures, information from financial 
statements and balance sheets, market share 
figures, and the like, are the result of action which 
have taken place in the past.  This information is of 
value when operating in static and simple market 
conditions, where forecasting, trends analysis and 
chain ratios, based on past events, are common 
place (Hooley et al, 2008a, pp 177-190).  In 
dynamic and complex markets, concept testing, 
scenarios, strategic planning, cross-impact analysis 
and expert opinion are required (Hooley et al, 
2008b, 191-198).  The simple collection and 
assimilation of past data is insufficient to assess the 
future. 
Analysts also need to use leading indicators of 
present and future activity and factor these into 
their understanding of the evolving competitive 
environment.  A skilled analyst knows that looking 
ahead is far more important than looking 
backwards.  Reliance on past data alone only 
summarises what is already known, it does not 
necessarily predict the future. 
Recommendations, propositions and 
judgements about the future are where competitive 
analysts earn their money and reputation.  It is only 
then that they are earning their salary, providing 
value added analytical output for use in their firm. 
5.7 Qualitative         Quantitative 
Qualitative analysis methods are those which are 
typically associated with interpretative approaches, 
rather than measuring discrete, observable events.  
Qualitative methods are most helpful in those areas 
that have been identified as potential weaknesses 
within the quantitative approach.  The use of 
interviews and observations provide a deeper, 
rather than a broader, data about a particular 
phenomenon.  These methods can be particularly 
valuable in helping to describe and explain the 
longitudinal evolution of competition and 
competitive behaviour (Johnston, 2005). 
Quantitative methods are more commonly used 
to examine a context at a single point in time, they 
seek “distinguishing characteristics, elemental 
properties and empirical boundaries and tend to 
examine ‘how much’ or ‘how often’ certain 
phenomena occur” (Nau, 1995).  The weaknesses 
of quantitative analytical process lie mainly in their 
failure to ascertain deeper underlying meanings 
and explanations of marketplace competition, even 
when they produce results that are significant, 
reliable and valid (Gilad, 2004). 
Recent surveys of tools used in assisting 
decision making show that the majority of 
managers and companies tend to favour the use of 
quantitative methods (Rigby & Bilodeau, 2007), 
principally because they tend to produce results 
which can be replicated and are more easily 
disseminated.  Quantitative analysis and results 
tend to be viewed as being more rigorous and free 
from interpretational bias (Davis, 2002), but it is 
also well understood that statistics are not always 
as “squeaky clean” as purported (Best 2001, Best 
2004). 
Effective analysts need to be able to apply and 
use both qualitative and quantitative methods and 
to be able to communicate both the results and the 
processes underlying their analysis.  Without 
understanding from where, and how, their results 
were derived, as well as the trade-offs made in 
achieving them, they leave themselves open to 
criticism.  
5.8 Automation        Human Process 
One aspect that every analyst must assess is the 
desire to automate their processes.  Many business 
processes have benefited greatly from the 'systems' 
approach and it certainly has its place.  Even a 
number of data gathering tasks that form the larger 
process of competitive intelligence, such as setting 
up targeted RSS feeds, automated “pushing” of 
competitors’ website changes, or media about 
competitors’ activities, have been productively 
automated (Vibert, 2001). Unfortunately, software 
developed to support the analytical process has, to 
date, not been impressive in performing or 
promoting effective analysis (Fuld, 2003). 
No 'magic bullet' or 'plug-in' solution exists that 
can replace the ability of the human brain to 
understand, assimilate and assess the type of data 
that analysts regularly deal with, much less make 
sense of it.  Whilst some automation may benefit 
the process, what automation can't yet carry out, 
and may never be able to do, is replicate the unique 
processes of strategic thinking that human beings 
can achieve.  This is especially true when this 
thinking includes the application of creativity and 
intuition previously described. 
5.9 Written/Spoken          Visualisation 
The issue of clearly communicating analytical 
processes and outcomes is ever-present. In volume 
terms, the written/spoken word is, arguably the 
most frequent form of delivery used.   
Unfortunately, not all spoken or written words are 
meaningful due to poor delivery, poor language 
skills and/or overuse of codes or acronyms which 
do not translate or travel across divisions or SBUs 
and, at times, an inappropriate context. 
Visualisation on the other hand, allows analysts 
to share their ideas in graphic, illustrative, pictorial 
formats. Being able to ‘draw a picture’ of a 
situation, visually describe competitors or their 
likely behaviours and use metaphors to aid 
understanding is far more powerful, and 
memorable, to busy decision makers then a 35 page 
report of closely typed text and figures.  The onus 
is on the MCS to make the story ‘live’, interpret 
their findings and provide a recommendation, 
rather than simply presenting the bare facts.  
Analysts also need to be aware of the preferences 
of their differing audiences and be able to develop 
the skills required to deliver to those needs. 
5.10 Objectivity         Subjectivity 
Nearly all tenets of analysis suggest that analysts 
must be objective, detached, dispassionate and 
unbiased in their work.  This does not mean that 
individuals can, or should, surrender their personal 
views but the analysis process is often more akin to 
the social sciences than to pure science.  
Consequently, there will always be some degree of 
error present.  Individuality by an analyst is highly 
desirable in the appropriate circumstances.  
Competitive analysts need to recognise when they 
are being objective and when they are not (Clark & 
Montgomery, 1996). This balance is difficult to 
achieve because few analysts are trained or 
coached to recognise their own biases and 
subjectivity. 
Subjectivity in analysis requires the same 
justification as any other form of objective 
measure.  It must be properly clarified so that 
decision makers can make their own judgement on 
the quality of the analysis and recommendations 
presented.  The analyst should always enter an 
assignment with an open mind, try to see things 
through the perspective of their data gatherers and 
decision-makers as well as market competitors in 
order to be empathetic to better understanding their 
own preconceived notions.  
6  Responding to Analysis Failure: 
Eight Guiding Principles for the 
Firm 
Effective analysts must know how to properly 
position their efforts and focus across the 
continuum over time.  That is not to say that 
analysts always need to find the middle ground on 
each continuum.  In fact, the middle ground may be 
exactly the wrong place to be.  Rather, the analyst 
needs to determine where they should be on a 
project along each of the continua, and be able to 
adapt along each, as the project and its evolution 
demands. 
There is however, a responsibility on the part of 
the firm to provide a suitable environment within 
which the analyst can carry out their work.  One in 
which they can learn their craft, experiment, 
develop and hone their skills.  It is the analyst who 
provided the intellectual input but it is the analysis 
process which determines success or otherwise.  
No matter how skilled the analyst, the decision 
making process, into which analytical output 
should inevitably be fed, will be significantly 
enhanced if the firm pays heed to these eight 
guiding principles. 
6.1 Provide Empowerment 
A common utterance in the intelligence community 
is that without intelligence, a decision-maker 
cannot take responsibility.  With it, he or she 
cannot avoid taking responsibility. Clearly, the 
more that decision makers are equipped with 
insight, the better they will perform. This is why 
the importance of intelligence analysis needs to be 
recognized in its own right.  Both analysts and 
executives need to promote the reality that analysis 
is critical to an organisation’s competitive success.  
Analysts and their internal customers should be 
comfortable with, and publicise to others, the real 
benefit which emanates from analysis.  It is an 
evolving discipline in its own right and competitive 
analysts are skilled professionals, operating no 
differently than others in the firm. 
6.2 Realize the Value of Analysis  
Even if the benefits and value of the process cannot 
be easily quantified by existing performance 
measurement systems, executives need to realize 
that effective analysis cannot be achieved through 
“quick fixes” or by the introduction of new 
software or hardware applications. The value of 
analysis comes from the insight it provides 
decision-makers, which ultimately benefits their 
enterprise. 
6.3 Value the Link between Analysis and 
Success 
Providing managers with case studies and 
examples of good and bad analytical outputs can 
help powerfully demonstrate this relationship 
between analysis quality and decision-making 
effectiveness. Using analysis insights will 
significantly lower the number of uncontrollable or 
perceived risks associated with decisions. 
6.4 Ask the Right Questions 
Consumers of analysis products should know what 
to ask for from analysts and be realistic in what 
they expect to receive. Executives and 
departmental managers, like many other employees 
within the organization, often misunderstand the 
true functions and proper operations of analysts or 
intelligence specialists.  Decision makers often ask 
for the wrong information and will then have 
difficulty in making sense of the analytical 
products they receive.  For the analyst, it is 
important that executives communicate just what is 
that will make a difference to their agenda, 
priorities, and needs as they perceive them.  Only 
then will the analyst be able to provide products 
that are tailored not only to decision-makers’ 
specific information requirements but also 
presented in their language. 
6.5 Measure Performance Appropriately 
The competencies, skills and capabilities of an 
analyst can be measured, therefore, it can be both 
managed and improved. The development of 
capability measurement tools and metrics to 
demonstrate improvement should be strongly 
encouraged. There is also a need to measure 
analysis products and processes against 
benchmarks.  Best practices in the analytic field 
should be studied, adapted and emulated. 
6.6 Position the Analyst Correctly 
It is vital that a competitive analyst is positioned 
where they can make a difference.  Analysts need 
to be actively involved in the networks of 
information collectors and their clients, but also be 
given the time needed to properly do their work. 
Also, the longer that an analyst can focus their 
efforts on particular specialties needed by decision 
makers, the quicker they will move up the learning 
curve in terms of producing quality outputs. 
As even the most effective analysts can provide 
inaccurate insight at times, decision-making clients 
need to give their analysts opportunities to fail and 
to demonstrate that they have learned from those 
experiences. This leads to the development of 
shared trust between an analyst and their decision-
maker. With security and the trust of their clients, 
analysts are at their most effective. 
6.7 Provision of the Right Tools 
As with any other skilled worker, the analyst needs 
to have access to all the proper tools of their craft.  
Analytic applications, reliable data inputs, access to 
sources, time to think, advanced information and 
communication infrastructure, and so on.  Analysts 
cannot be expected to provide insight without 
having access to rich sources of data, enabling 
technology, the open door of their organisational 
colleagues and clearly articulated KITs/KIQs.  The 
outputs will then be focused to capture the client’s 
imagination and provide assistance on complex 
issues both quickly and comprehensively.  The 
analyst’s job must not be to intimidate clients with 
information, but rather to entice them with it. 
6.8 Differentiate the Task 
Last, but certainly not least, competitive analysts 
must differentiate the nature of the analysis they 
perform from other forms of analysis concurrently 
being done within their enterprises. Analysts and 
their decision makers should be careful not to 
overrate. Overemphasise or try and duplicate the 
analysis of organizations, industries, and markets 
that is typically provided by economists, financial 
analysts, sector analysts and/or market researchers.  
These individuals are primarily concerned with 
short-term financial gains, customer satisfaction, 
product placement, and related concerns, not 
necessarily with long-term competitiveness and 
strategic development. Executives who understand 
the reasons these functions vary, and the respective 
benefits each generates, will be far better served by 
their analyst and their potential contribution to 
decision making. 
7  Conclusion 
Gilad (1994) notes that intelligence is an insight 
about externally motivated change, future 
developments and their implications to the 
organisation. Done well, analysis and the 
intelligence developed from it, helps the 
organisation to reduce its risk level in dealing with 
both threats and opportunities in its competitive 
environment.  Paradoxically, the analysis function 
tends to suffer during recessionary periods, when 
organizations reduce their commitment to what 
they deem as less-essential functions.  Those 
working in analysis know that this is precisely the 
time when investment in such activity should 
increase, in order to better prepare the firm for the 
challenges ahead. 
We have identified five key causes of failure at 
the individual level and would draw special 
attention to the issue of cognitive bias, a factor 
which both analysts and educators should be 
acutely aware.  It is noted that the teaching of 
analysis receives superficial attention amongst 
educators and at best, is haphazard.  Analysis is a 
critical component in aiding executives in their 
decision making and as such, effective analysts 
must know how to properly position their efforts 
and focus, over time, across the 10 key continua 
presented in this paper.  That is not to say that 
analysts always need to find the middle ground on 
each continuum.  In fact, the middle ground may be 
exactly the wrong place to be.  Rather, the analyst 
needs to determine where they should be on a 
project along each of the continua, and be able to 
adapt along each, as the project and its evolution 
demands.     Unfortunately, teaching the art of 
pragmatism, intuition and "gut feel" is less evident 
and is an element of learning which continues to 
evade educators, not least because of their lack of 
experience of actually doing this sort of work in a 
commercial environment, their lack of experience 
at having to defend the findings of analysis when 
critical decisions will be taken on the basis of their 
work, and their almost inevitable lack of 
understanding of what is needed by employers. 
The problems inherent in analysis failure can be 
fixed and we present eight guiding principle for the 
firm which will assist in helping to prevent analysis 
failure and improve the potential for the delivery of 
high quality output.  When the full realisation of 
the impact that skilled analysts can have on a 
firm’s success is understood, it makes sense that 
this would be one way of promoting best practice.  
The ultimate ambition would be the development 
of a validated education path which leads to a 
recognised qualification with standards of practice 
and Chartered status.  Such a development would 
only be good news in the dynamic, globalised 
markets within which most organisations now 
conduct their business and which seek to recruit 
employees able to show the attainment of a ‘gold’ 
standard of expertise. 
8  Future Work 
This paper is the fore-runner to a funded research 
project which aims to better understand the precise 
personal qualities which employers seek when 
hiring analysts and the expertise which they expect 
their new employees to bring to the firm.  This will 
then be the subject of a large scale, survey of 
professionals in higher education to discover 
whether, and how, these highly valued ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ skills are being taught in the classroom.  It is 
anticipated that the findings from this research will 
inform and guide future curriculum developments 
for post graduate educational offerings. 
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